'The campaign was of shorter duration than the campaigns in other major theatres of war, but it was characterised by an exceptionallylarge number of battle casualties and admissions to hospital for disease. As regards the medical services, it differed from other campaigns in the special difficulties encountered in, and measures requited for, collecting and evacuating the sick and wounded, and in dealing with problems of sanitation. In fact it may be said that nowhere throughout the war had greater difficulties to be faced in providing for the care and comfort of the sick and wounded, and in maintaining the health of the troops ... the initial failure of the medical services, referred to in the Dardanelles Commission Report was thus due to the difficulties with which not only the medical but all other administrative services had to contend, to previous lack of training in combined operations such as those at the landing on the Gallipoli Peninsula, and, more especially, to a miscalculation of the extent of the opposition and the failure to effect an immediate rapid advance inland' (History of the Great War (924). ' The many difficulties which the Army Medical Services encountered in the Norwegian Campaign were not of their own. making. They were created by the terrain, by the weather and by the circumstances which imposed upon the Force the necessity for an agitated despatch and for a mournful and inglorious return. Much of' the medical equipment proved to be unsuitable, much was lost en route by enemy action and the campaign did not last long enough for improvements to be made and for replacements to be sent. The enemy's complete supremacy in the air made the dispersion of units imperative in a country sparsely populated with few roads and fewer towns' (History of the Second World War 1956).
In the event, in the South Atlantic the outcome Was more fortunate, but the brilliance of the military success has naturally rather overshadowed the contribution made by the logistic Support of the operation and the part played by the medical services in caring for the wounded o141-{)768/83/110903-{)2/$O1.00/0 and the sick and in helping to maintain the morale of a superb fighting force.
In the report of the symposium, held by the United Services Section of the Royal Society of Medicine on 17 and 18 February 1983 at the Royal College of Surgeons, and published in this issue of the Journal (p 972), the problems of communication and logistic support over a distance of almost 8000 miles are described in some detail. Medical supply and resupply, the fitting out of the SS Uganda as a hospital ship, including an intensive care ward and a separate burns unit, and the conversion of the SS Canberra to carry troops with a supporting medical squadron of the Commando Logistic Regiment are recounted. Blood was required; some came from England and some was obtained from the troops during their journey south. During the three weeks at sea, while the Task Force sailed south and diplomatic activity was at its height, medical officers trained personnel in first aid and reread the field surgical pocketbook.
The account of the war at sea was vividly illustrated in the symposium by young, recently. qualified Surgeon Lieutenants of the Royal Navy, who described the fire and the smoke and the plight of the wounded, and the difficulties experienced in lowering them over the side of a sinking ship. As in World War II, the proportion of dead to wounded in the stricken ships was very high, but fortunately the loss of life from drowning and hypothermia was very low. This was mainly due to the skill and daring of naval helicopter pilots and crewmen who recovered the casualties, but was also a reflection of the success of a research programme at the Institute of Naval Medicine which has shown the importance of hypothermia as a cause of death when ships are sunk or have to be abandoned. A major programme of research into the effects of smoke inhalation was justified by the excellent results of immediate treatment with methyl prednisolone.
Burns were an important cause of injury. Brigadier Michae1i has described the problem of burn injury for the Israeli Forces in 1973 (Michaeli 1979); although burns were sustained in tanks, many could possibly have been prevented by better design and by the use of protective clothing. Certainly some of the minor burns sustained in the ships in the South Atlantic could have been prevented by simple protective measures, but the management of burn casualties will continue to be an important medical task in the Royal Navy. The setting up of a Tri-Service .Burns Unit at the Queen Elizabeth Military Hospital, Woolwich, was an important factor in the planning for the initial management of burn casualties in the Uganda and continuation treatment back in England.
. The war could have been lost at sea but it had to be won on the land, and a major decision which had to be taken shortly after the initial landings at San Carlos was whether to evacuate casualties directly from the point of wounding back to SS Uganda and SS Canberra or whether to establish a surgical facility on shore. In the event SS Canberra, because it carried troops, was a legitimate military target and the SS Uganda, because it might become an accidental target for missiles fired from 14 miles away, could not remain just off shore. The story of the field hospital at Ajax Bay was vividly told and brilliantly illustrated. Fortunately the senior surgeon, Lieutenant-Colonel McGregor, and-the senior anaesthetist, Lieutenant-Colonel Knight, had previous experience of setting up their field equipment and operating without the benefit of electricity or water supply in surroundings that would normally be regarded as unsuitable for any form of surgery.
All the medical officers of the Royal Marine Commandos, the Parachute Brigade and the 5th Infantry Brigade understood the military principles of evacuation of the wounded with first aid, triage and staged surgery. The Regimental Aid Post of the 2nd Battalion of the Parachute Regiment at the attack at Goose Green was a spot on a bare hillside where the medical officer and his regimental orderlies dressed wounds, set up intravenous infusions and gave morphia as an analgesic when it was necessary. The Regimental Aid Posts of the other battalions and of the Commandos were equally exposed, and the performance of the young medical officers under these conditions is a reflection of the excellence of the character and training of the young doctors coming out of our medical schools and in particular of those who choose to serve in the Armed Forces. The casualty evacuation system is designed to get the wounded back to the surgical team as quickly as possible and in as good a state as possible for surgery. It worked well, and success of the surgical teams was reflected in an unusually low mortality rate in the patients coming to surgery. British military surgical policy in .the management of missile wounds, which has gradually evolved from World War II experience, updated in Korea, Suez, Malaya, Cyprus, Borneo, Jordan, Aden, Oman and Northern Ireland, and been enlightened by a continuous programme of research into the pathology and treatment of battle injury, proved to be very satisfactory. The Tri-Service anaesthetic apparatus has been developed over the last 20 years and each step in its development has been tested under active service field conditions. Anaesthetists often work unseen and are less likely than other doctors to attract the attentions of those who write citations for awards. The excellence of the anaesthetic support in the South Atlantic was thoroughly appreciated at the Royal College of Surgeons and the fact that it was possible under these extreme conditions to provide first class anaesthesia is another indication of the rapid advances in this specialty since World War II.
History records that there was no medical plan prior to the landings at Gallipoli. The medical plan in the South Atlantic was successfully implemented and involved the return of casualties through Montevideo by the aeromedical teams of the Royal Air Force. The problems of long-range missions with the sleep difficulties of aircrew were covered in the symposium and are reported in the paper by Baird, Coles and Nicholson on page 933.
The report of the symposium ends with a section on medical lessons. The clinician may be dismayed to find that it concentrates on planning, training and logistics. Within the report, however, is described the successful application of research, the science and art of the practice of military medicine and records of the personal experiences of young men in whom the medical profession can take great pride.
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